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RATIONING OF HEALTH CARE AND
UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE SICK
David Orentlicher*
Introduction
As this country faces rising health care costs, it has become increas-
ingly clear that we cannot afford all medically beneficial care. Advances
in technology are pushing health care costs to an unsustainable level-
spending on health care has reached nearly fourteen percent of this coun-
try's Gross Domestic Product (GDP).2 Some savings can be achieved by
eliminating waste in the health care system. The health care system is
plagued by a good deal of excess capacity 3 as well as considerable
inefficiency in administrative activities. 4 Elimination of waste, however,
would not free up enough resources to cover all potentially useful medical
services.5 Moreover, the public has a host of welfare needs, including
better housing, education, and environmental protection, but has a limited
purse. If we are to have any money left to pay for these other goods, we
must place greater limits on spending for health care services. 6 In short,
rationing of health care is inevitable.7 This Article will focus on a critical
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am grateful for the comments of Judy Failer, Jeff Leslie, Phil Peters, and Susan Hoffman
Williams; the insights of Einer Elhuage, Cass Sunstein, and the participants of a University
of Chicago Law School workshop; the editing efforts of Beverly Armstrong, Joseph Clark,
Julia Judish, Kristy Parker, and Jessica Roth, and the research assistance of Lakshmi Reddy.
I William B. Schwartz, The Inevitable Failure of Current Cost-containment Strategies:
Why They Can Provide Only Temporary Relief, 257 JAMA 220 (1987).2 TiOTHY J. HAUSER & JAMES D. JAMESON, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. INDUS-
TRIAL OUTLOOK, 1993, 42-1 (1993).
3 See, e.g., Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Rationing Health Care: The Unnecessary Solution,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 1525, 1527-28 (1992); Victor R. Fuchs, No Pain, No Gain: Perspec-
tives on Cost Containment, 269 JAMA 631, 632 (1993).4 See, e.g., David U. Himmelstein & Steffie Woolhandler, Cost Without Benefit:
Administrative Waste in U.S. Health Care, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 441 (1986); Califano,
supra note 3, at 1528.
5 See, e.g., Jan Blustein & Theodore R. Marmor, Cutting Waste by Making Rules:
Promises, Pitfalls, and Realistic Prospects, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1543, 1564 (1992)
(observing that eliminating all "wasteful" care means cutting some medically beneficial
care); Michael J. Graetz & Jerry L. Mashaw, Ethics, Institutional Complexity and Health
Care Reform: The Struggle for Normative Balance, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y
93, 95 (1994).
6 See Leonard M. Fleck, Just Health Care Rationing: A Democratic Decisionmaking
Approach, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1597, 1603 (1992).
7 See David M. Eddy, Health System Reform: Will Controlling Costs Require Rationing
Services?, 272 JAMA 324 (1994).
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issue for health care rationing: How can we ration health care in a way
that does not discriminate unfairly on the basis of sickness?
Historically, this country has rationed health care primarily on the
basis of ability to pay. As sentiment grows for ensuring universal access
to health care regardless of income or wealth, other bases for rationing
will be needed, and alternative methods for rationing often distinguish on
the basis of sickness. 8 Many have argued that health care costs can be
contained by eliminating care for patients who have poor prognoses and
for whom health care yields less benefit than for other patients. 9 Proposals
to control health care costs also call for less coverage for some categories
of illnesses than for others.10
These alternative methods for containing costs raise important con-
cerns about equity. Differential funding by type of disease may reflect
invidious biases against people who suffer from disfavored illnesses. For
example, one employer provided maximum lifetime coverage of $1 mil-
lion to employees for medical expenses from cancer, heart disease, and
As the discussion suggests, this Article is using the term "rationing" to mean the
denial of health care services because the services are unaffordable rather than because
there is a natural shortage of the services, as with organ transplants. Some commentators
object to characterizing rationing as a denial of services on cost grounds. See, e.g., Clark
C. Havighurst, Prospective Self-Denial: Can Consumers Contract Today to Accept Health
Care Rationing Tomorrow?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1755, 1758-64 (1992). We do not, for
example, say that we are rationing houses or automobiles when people are unable to
purchase their desired house or car. Nevertheless, the term "rationing" is commonly used
to mean the denial of health care services because the services are unaffordable. See, e.g.,
Mark A. Hall, Rationing Health Care at the Bedside, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 693, 695 n.2
(1994); Philip G. Peters, Jr., Health Care Rationing and Disability Rights, 70 IND. L.J.
491, 492 (1995). Health care services are different from houses and automobiles because
of the existence of health care insurance, which commonly promises to cover all "medi-
cally necessary" services. Since not all medically beneficial services can be covered,
insurers must decide whether a particular service is medically necessary. Some patients
will be denied medically unnecessary services because of the costs, but, since ability to
pay is not a factor within a particular insurance plan, the denial of coverage raises the
same issues and concerns as does a denial of treatment based on a natural shortage of
resources.
8 See Eddy, supra note 7.
9 Health care is already being rationed by denying care to patients who will derive
less benefit than other patients. For example, when decisions are made about allocating
the limited supply of organs for transplantation, preference is given to the patients in
whom the organs will survive the longest. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs,
American Medical Association, Ethical Considerations in the Allocation of Organs and
Other Scarce Medical Resources Among Patients, 155 ARCH. INTERNAL MED. 29, 36
(1995). Under some proposals, care would be withheld from the elderly, the terminally ill,
or the permanently unconscious. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Schneiderman, Nancy S. Jecker et
al., Medical Futility: Its Meaning and Ethical Implications, 112 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
949 (1990); Gov. Lanm Asserts Elderly, If Very Ill, Have "Duty to Die" N.Y. TIMEs, Mar.
29, 1984, at A16; see generally DANIEL CALLAHAN, SETTING LIMITS: MEDICAL GOALS IN
AN AGING SOCIETY (1987).
10 For example, as many private health insurers currently do, President Clinton's health
care reform proposal would have funded psychiatric care less generously than non-psychi-
atric care. See H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1115 (1993).
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other serious illnesses but capped lifetime coverage to employees with
AIDS at $5,000. 1 Denial of care to patients who would gain less benefit
from treatment appears to base rationing decisions on objectively fair
criteria, but these differences in prognoses among patients often reflect
the biases inherent in social policies and structures. A patient with a
psychiatric disorder may realize little benefit from treatment primarily
because the stigma of psychiatric illness has led researchers and funders
of research to neglect psychiatric illness when developing treatments for
disease. Moreover, patients may have a poor prognosis, not because their
condition is inherently difficult to treat, but because it has been histori-
cally disfavored by the operation of society's policies and institutions. 12
Anti-discrimination statutes, in their language and legislative history,
recognize that persons with disabilities need protection not only against
current invidious bias but also against discrimination arising out of biases
inherent in social structure. Accordingly, the statutes include a principle
of reasonable accommodations that requires the implementation of meas-
ures that will help compensate for these biases. While courts have inter-
preted anti-discrimination statutes in ways that respond to discrimination
arising out of current invidious bias, they have not addressed the discrimi-
nation that arises from biases inherent in the social structure. This Article
argues that courts have not given adequate recognition to the principle of
reasonable accommodations embedded within the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") 13 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,14 and
therefore have not fulfilled congressional intent to prevent unfair discrimi-
nation on the basis of sickness. Similarly, while other scholars have
criticized existing judicial standards and proposed modifications to those
standards, 15 they have failed to give full recognition to the principle of
reasonable accommodations.
The inadequacy of judicial interpretations has critical implications.
In many cases, rationing of health care involves a choice between who
"See McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 482 (1992) (holding that reducing maximum medical benefits given to an employee
with AIDS was not unlawful discrimination under ERISA because the reduction applied
equally to all employees).
12For example, patients with chronic lung disease may do poorly with some treatments
for coronary artery disease because the treatments are designed on the assumption that
coronary artery disease patients will have normal lung function. See, e.g., Roger W. Evans,
Need, Demand, and Supply in Organ Transplantation, 24 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS
2152 (1992).
1342 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. 1993).
1429 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. 1995).
15 See, e.g., Mary A. Crossley, Of Diagnoses and Discrimination: Discriminatory
Nontreatment of Infants with HIV Infection, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1581, 1646-55 (1993);
E. Haavi Morreim, Futilitarianism, Exoticare, and Coerced Altruism: The ADA Meets Its
Limits, 25 SETON HALL L. REv. 883, 894-97, 922-25 (1995); Peters, supra note 7, at
523-25, 545-46.
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shall live and who shall die. In other cases, rationing can have profound
effects on a person's quality of life. When the stakes are this high, it is
particularly important that the law offer maximum protection against
unfair discrimination.
To remedy the deficiencies in existing standards, this Article proposes
a new standard that is explicitly designed to address discrimination from
biases inherent in the social structure. This "destructured disability stand-
ard" should more fully realize the goals that are an essential part of
current anti-discrimination law.
I. Rationing Health Care
Inasmuch as we cannot avoid rationing, the question becomes how
rationing should be implemented. The prevailing form of rationing is
based on the ability to pay.16 If we move to a system of universal access
to a package of basic health care benefits, however, we will have to make
some very difficult decisions about what the basic benefits package will
include. Even if we retain our current system, the need to contain health
care costs will require a good deal of rationing on grounds other than
ability to pay. For example, when people join a health maintenance or-
ganization (HMO) that promises all medically necessary care, the HMO
must decide what is medically necessary. Likewise, when a hospital's
intensive care unit (ICU) beds are oversubscribed, the hospital must de-
cide which patients will be treated in the ICU and which patients will
not. 17
A number of potential methods for rationing are available to supple-
ment or replace rationing on the basis of ability to pay. These alternative
methods fall into two categories: rationing by type of patient and rationing
by type of service. Rationing by type of patient may involve giving health
care to those patients who will derive the most benefit from the care (for
example, allocating coronary artery bypass surgery to persons who will
gain the longest extension in life expectancy from the surgery) or by
providing each person with identical benefits (for instance, limiting hos-
pitalization to fourteen days a year 18 or distributing insurance vouchers
161n addition to ability to pay, other factors have played an important role in
determining access to care. Health care plans, both public and private, have denied
coverage for treatments when costs are high and benefits uncertain. See, e.g., William P.
Peters & Mark C. Rogers, Variation in Approval by Insurance Companies of Coverage for
Autologous Bone Marrow Transplantation for Breast Cancer, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 473
(1994) (reporting on the variability among private health insurers in approving coverage
for breast cancer patients in clinical research trials).
17See, e.g., Daniel E. Singer, Phyllis L. Carr, Albert G. Mulley, & George E. Thibault,
Rationing Intensive Care-Physician Responses to a Resource Shortage, 309 NEw ENG.
J. MuD. 1155 (1983) (recounting one hospital's response to reduction in ICU capacity).
18Tennessee once took this approach to limit its Medicaid expenditures. See Alexander
[Vol. 31
Rationing of Health Care
worth $3,500). Rationing by service may involve preferring certain kinds
of care (for example, favoring preventive and early childhood services
over expensive and aggressive treatments of the terminally ill).
A. Rationing by Patient
Rationing by patient occurs when a particular medical service is
available, but not to everyone who might benefit from it. In general,
rationing by patient conserves medical resources by favoring persons
more seriously disabled by their illnesses. A health plan might cover
lumbar spinal disc surgery for patients whose nerve compression causes
severe pain, but not for those with mild lower back pain. 19 Rationing by
type of patient can also occur more subtly. Some health plans establish a
total budget for health care services and require their physicians to operate
within its constraints. 20 To ensure efficient use of the limited resources,
physicians might offer lumbar spinal disc surgery to the more seriously
affected patients but not to patients who are mildly disabled.
Rationing by patient, however, can also result in fewer services for
patients who are more affected by illness. For example, a transplant
program might deny a liver transplant to a patient who suffers from liver
failure and schizophrenia in favor of a patient who suffers from liver
failure only. Or, a transplant program might offer a liver transplant to
patients with liver cancer when the cancer is detected relatively early but
deny transplantation to patients with more advanced liver cancer. The
rationale for denying treatment to the sicker patient is that the healthier
patient gains a greater benefit from the treatment. This Article argues,
however, that a rationing system that allocates care on the basis of degree
of benefit will often result in unfair discrimination against sicker patients
or patients with more disabling conditions.
B. Rationing by Service
Rationing by service occurs when only certain medical services are
covered. For example, health care plans typically cover appendectomies
and coronary artery bypass surgeries but not artificial reproduction. Plans
might also cover unlimited hospitalization for physical illness but cap
v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985) (allowing a reduction in inpatient days covered by
Medicaid).
19 See George W. Wood II, Lower Back Pain and Disorders of Intervertebral Discs,
in CAMPBELL'S OPERATIVE ORTHOPAEDICS 3715 (A.H. Crenshaw ed., 8th ed. 1992)
(discussing disc disease and its treatment).2 0 This is essentially how the British health care system works. See generally HENRY
A. AARON & WILLIAM B. SCHWARTZ, THE PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION: RATIONING HEALTH
CARE (1984).
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coverage for psychiatric illness at sixty days per year.21 Rationing by
service often conserves medical resources to protect those most disabled
by illness. Yet rationing by service can also subject the sickest persons to
unfair discrimination. Rationing by service may result in coverage for
persons with a milder form of an illness while leaving those with a more
severe form of the same illness uncovered. For example, a sixty-day cap
on coverage for psychiatric hospitalizations would not provide sufficient
coverage for many persons with serious psychiatric illnesses but would
fully meet the needs of those with mild illnesses. Rationing by service
also discriminates against sick persons when a health plan's coverage
favors certain types of illnesses over others. If psychiatric coverage is
capped, then persons with severe psychiatric disorders who need long-
term hospitalization are deprived of necessary care while persons with
severe heart or lung disease or persons with advanced cancer receive all
necessary care.
22
II. Failure of Current Interpretations of Anti-Discrimination Law to
Prevent Unfair Discrimination
A. Rationing by Patient
Because there are different statutory provisions for rationing by pa-
tient and rationing by service, and because the two types of rationing raise
different ethical and medical considerations, this Article discusses the two
types of rationing separately. Nevertheless, it concludes that a unified
standard should be applied by the courts to the two types of rationing.
In analyzing rationing by patient, this Article focuses on the rationing
by patient of kidneys, hearts, or other organs for transplantation. 23 In these
situations, a patient might be denied an organ transplant or be assigned a
21See, e.g., H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1115(c)(2)(D) (1993).
The Oregon Health Plan, which serves state Medicaid beneficiaries, presents another
example of rationing primarily by service. Under the Oregon plan, 696 different health
care services have been ranked in terms of priority, and coverage is provided through
number 565. Michael Janofsky, Oregon Starts to Extend Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
19, 1994, at 6.
22As the preceding discussion suggests, when the issue is discrimination against
persons with disabilities in access to health care, we are often dealing with comparisons
between persons with different kinds of disabilities (for example, heart disease vs.
psychiatric disease) or comparisons between persons with different degrees of the same
disability (for example, mild vs. severe psychiatric disease), rather than simple compari-
sons between persons with or without disabilities. This is largely because most people
who need medical treatment are considered disabled under the definitions of anti-discrimi-
nation law. See infra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
23 This analysis easily generalizes to other kinds of rationing decisions. Once we move
to methods for rationing other than ability to pay, the issues and concerns that are raised
by decisions about allocating limited resources are the same whether the resource is
limited because of natural shortage or cost constraints. See supra note 7.
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lower waiting-list priority because the patient also suffers from mental
retardation, a psychiatric disability, or alcoholism.24
1. Relevant Statutory Provisions
The relevant federal statutes for protecting the sick from unfair dis-
crimination are the ADA and, to a much lesser extent, its predecessor law,
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. According to the legislative history of the
ADA, it was enacted "to provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate to end discrimination against individuals with disabilities 25 The
two acts contain similar statutory language and very broadly prohibit
discrimination against persons with disabilities in the areas of employ-
ment,26 public 27 or private28 education, transportation, 29 health care, 30 and
in access to any other public or private services and programs. 31 The
Rehabilitation Act applies to federal executive agencies and to recipients
of federal funding.32 The ADA applies to Congress and to all non-federal
agencies or programs, public or private, whether or not they are recipients
of federal funding. 33
To be protected by the ADA or Rehabilitation Act, individuals must
show that they have been subjected to discrimination on the basis of their
disability. Such a showing, however, does not end the inquiry. Because it
sometimes makes sense to take a person's disability into account, dis-
crimination can be justified on the ground that the disability makes the
person a poor candidate for the job, program, or service at stake. Finally,
even if individuals are poor candidates, they may not be denied access to
the job, program, or service if reasonable accommodations 34 can help
overcome their disadvantage. 35
The first issue, then, is whether an individual meets the statutory
definition of a person with a disability. The definition of disability under
the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act is broad and ordinarily will not hinder
lawsuits claiming discrimination on the basis of sickness in health care
rationing. According to the two acts, a disability exists when an individual
24 See, e.g., James L. Levenson & Mary Ellen Olbrisch, Psychosocial Evaluation of
Organ Transplant Candidates: A Comparative Survey of Process, Criteria, and Outcomes
in Heart, Liver, and Kidney Transplantation, 34 PSYCHOSOMATICS 317 (1993).25 H.R. REP. No. 485 (II), 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 22 (1990).
2642 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (Supp. 1993).
2742 U.S.C. § 12132 (Supp. 1993).
2842 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(J) (Supp. 1993).
2942 U.S.C. §§ 12132, 12184 (Supp. 1993).
3042 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (Supp. 1993).
3142 U.S.C. §§ 12132, 12182(a) (Supp. 1993).
3229 U.S.C. § 794(a) (West Supp. 1995).
3342 U.S.C. §§ 12111(2), 12131(1), 12181(6),(7) (Supp. 1993).
34See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
35 See Peters, supra note 7, at 505-08.
1996]
56 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
has any illness, physical or psychological, that "substantially limits" a
major life activity such as walking, learning, breathing, or working.36
Persons with chronic lung disease are considered disabled because they
are substantially limited in their ability to breathe;37 persons with schizo-
phrenia are considered disabled because they are substantially limited in
their ability to work. Even if a person's disabling symptoms could be
alleviated with treatment, the person would still be considered disabled.38
A person also meets the legal definition of disability if that person has a
history of a disabling condition (for instance, cancer in remission) or if
others regard the person as having a disability that substantially limits a
major life activity (for example, HIV infection).3 9
Having met the statutory definition of a person with a disability, the
potential claimant must then show discrimination on the basis of disabil-
ity. This second inquiry is much more complicated.
In defining discrimination on the basis of disability, the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act have different provisions for employers, governments,
and private operators of public accommodations. Since these different
provisions parallel each other,40 this Article assumes for purposes of sim-
plification that we are dealing with the allocation of organs by a transplant
program at a private hospital, which constitutes a private operator of a
public accommodation. This brings the analysis under Subchapter In of
the ADA.41
Among the provisions of the ADA that prohibit discriminatory prac-
tices, two of those provisions might apply to denials of organs or assign-
ments of lower priority on the waiting list by a private hospital. One
provision prohibits discrimination "on the basis of disability in the full
and equal enjoyment of the . . . services . . .of any place of public
accommodation," 42 where hospitals are explicitly defined as public accom-
modations. 43 This provision suggests that hospitals must not condition
eligibility for their organ transplant programs on the absence of disabling
conditions. A hospital could not deny organ transplants to persons who
are blind or paraplegic simply because of their blindness or paraplegia
nor give them a lower priority on the waiting list.
36See 28 C.FR. § 36.104 (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (1994).37 H.R. REP. No. 485 (II), supra note 25, at 52.38 1 d.
3942 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. 1993). Common conditions that qualify as a disability
include diabetes, 28 C.F.R. § 36.104, epilepsy, id., alcoholism, id., and morbid obesity,
Cook v. Rhode Island, 10 .3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993).40See David Orentlicher, Rationing and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 271
JAMA 308, 309 (1994).
4142 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (Supp. 1993).421d.
4342 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (Supp. 1993).
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The second provision that applies to private entities addresses so-
called "disparate impact" discrimination." The ADA recognizes that much
discrimination against the disabled does not come in the form of inferior
treatment expressly on the basis of disability. Rather, discrimination often
occurs when a program adopts seemingly neutral eligibility or screening
criteria for access to the program that, when applied, tend systematically
to disfavor persons with disabilities. Accordingly, the ADA generally
prohibits the use of eligibility criteria by private operators of public
accommodations when the criteria tend to have the effect of screening out
persons with disabilities. 45
Despite this prohibition, many common eligibility criteria for organ
transplantation either explicitly exclude or have a tendency to screen out
persons with disabilities. For example, many transplant programs com-
monly exclude persons with schizophrenia or exclude people who do not
comply with medication regimens since organ recipients must take certain
medications for the rest of their lives. 46 Such noncompliance is common
in people with psychiatric disorders.47 Accordingly, the eligibility criterion
of compliance has the effect of screening out persons disabled by psychi-
atric illness. Thus, on their face, these two provisions of the ADA appear
to preclude the use of many common eligibility criteria for organ trans-
plantation.
There are times, however, when it is appropriate to take a person's
disability into account, and the ADA permits discriminatory treatment
accordingly. First, the ADA allows hospitals, insurers, or similar organi-
zations to engage in traditional risk classification practices as long as the
practices are not designed as subterfuges to evade the purposes of the
ADA.48 Consequently, when an organ transplant program denies organs
on the basis of sickness or based on criteria that screen out sicker persons,
the program could justify its decisions in terms of traditional risk clas-
sification practices. If patients have sicknesses that compromise their
ability to benefit from organ donation, then transplant program adminis-
trators could argue that it does not make sense to give such patients the
44 Disparate impact discrimination occurs when a policy that is facially neutral with
respect to a particular group nevertheless affects members of that group differently from
others.
45 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 1993) (defining discrimination to include "the
imposition or application of eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an
individual with a disability").
46See Levenson & Olbrisch, supra note 24, at 319. Potential rejection of a transplanted
organ by the recipient's body is delayed or prevented by transplanting organs between
people who are immunologically similar and by giving drugs to the recipient that block
the immune system from rejecting the organ.47 See, e.g., Albert R. Jonsen, Ethical Issues in Compliance, in COMPLIANCE IN
HEALTH CARE 114 (R. Brian Haynes et al. eds., 1979); David Orentlicher, Denying
Treatment to the Noncompliant Patient, 265 JAMA 1579, 1580-81 (1991).
4842 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(1) (Supp. 1993).
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same priority on the organ transplantation list as persons who would gain
a greater benefit.
The ADA also permits the use of eligibility criteria that exclude or
tend to screen out persons with disabilities as long as the criteria are
necessary for the operation of the program.49 Transplant program admin-
istrators could then argue that they have an obligation to allocate organs
where they will do the most good, and that their eligibility criteria are
designed to serve that goal.
The preceding discussion illustrates the tension within the ADA be-
tween unjustified and justified discrimination against persons with dis-
abilities. On the one hand, the ADA says that transplant programs cannot
use eligibility criteria that deny organs or result in lower waiting list
priorities on the basis of disability, nor can they use eligibility criteria
that deny organs or result in lower waiting list priorities if the criteria
tend to screen out persons with disabilities. On the other hand, the ADA
says that transplant programs can use eligibility criteria even if they
disadvantage persons with disabilities as long as the criteria are reason-
able risk classification measures or are necessary for the operation of the
organ transplant program. Taken together, these provisions suggest that
transplant programs can use eligibility criteria as long as they really help
distinguish among different candidates for organ transplantation in terms
of the candidates' likelihood of benefiting from the transplant. If organ
transplants are not as effective for people with schizophrenia,5 0 then it
may be permissible to take schizophrenia into account when allocating
organs. Indeed, as the next section of this Article demonstrates, this
conclusion is consistent with judicial opinions interpreting similar provi-
sions in the Rehabilitation Act when rationing decisions have been chal-
lenged.
2. Judicial Interpretations of Relevant Statutory Provisions
Case law construing the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act is sparse for
a variety of reasons. The ADA took effect only recently, so case law is
still in its infancy. The Rehabilitation Act, by contrast, is more than
twenty years old but has more limited coverage.51 In addition, in the first
rationing cases to reach the federal appellate courts, the opinions con-
strued the protections of the Rehabilitation Act narrowly, possibly dis-
couraging later claims of discriminatory health care rationing. In spite of
4942 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 1993).50 Transplanted organs may not function as long in persons with schizophrenia because
they are less likely than persons without schizophrenia to take the anti-rejection drugs.
51 See text accompanying note 32.
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these limitations, the existing case law serves to underscore the impor-
tance of likelihood of benefit in upholding rationing criteria.
The leading case in this area, United States v. University Hospital,
52
is one of the so-called "Baby Doe" cases from the 1980s involving
newborn infants with severely handicapping medical problems. University
Hospital and the other Baby Doe cases were brought because newborns
were denied aggressive surgical procedures that could prolong their lives
(although the procedures would have little effect on the newborns' quality
of life).53 The baby in University Hospital, in addition to having physical
problems, was thought to have such compromised mental function that
she would "never interact with her environment or other people."54 The
University Hospital court upheld the denial of treatment in an opinion that
suggests many possible reasons for the decision. Consequently, the case
has been characterized in a number of ways.
a. Anti-Discrimination Law Was Not Intended to Apply to Medical
Decisions
University Hospital rested in part on the view that the anti-discrimina-
tion laws were not meant to apply to medical judgments as distinguished
from other kinds of judgments.55 According to this line of reasoning,
judgments about eligibility for medical treatment are qualitatively different
from judgments about eligibility for education or employment.56 While a
physician's outright refusal to provide any treatment to a person because
of their disability would be prohibited,57 anti-discrimination law would not
reach a physician's judgment that a person's disability disqualified the per-
son from a particular treatment. The basis for this distinction between
medical and non-medical decisions is not clear, but it may reflect the
court's view that medical decisions are objective and scientific.
Judgments about eligibility for medical treatment, however, are no
different in kind from the cost/benefit analyses that employers make in
deciding whether to hire a person with a disability. An employer looks at
the expected productivity of the applicant and discounts it by the costs of
employing him or her. Similarly, eligibility criteria for medical care gen-
erally take into account the expected medical benefit from the treatment
52729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984).
53See id. at 146.54 d. Both the parents and the physicians agreed not to treat the infant.551d. at 156-60.
56 See id. at 156.57For example, a physician would be prohibited from entirely refusing to provide care
to persons with HIV infection. See United States v. Morvant, 843 F. Supp. 1092, 1094-96
(E.D. La. 1994) (holding that a dentist could be liable under the ADA for denying services
on account of a patient's HIV infection).
1996]
60 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
discounted by the costs of providing it, where costs include not only
financial costs but also the risks of injury to the patient. Rationing deci-
sions reflect not only technical medical judgments but also value judg-
ments about the proper balance between medical costs and benefits.
The following example illustrates how some medical judgments are
similar to other value judgments. Generally, obstetricians offer amniocen-
tesis to check for Down syndrome in pregnant women without a family
history of Down syndrome only if the women are at least thirty-five years
old.58 This general rule reflects, in part, the fact that when the woman is
age thirty-five or over, the risk that the fetus will suffer from Down
syndrome is equal to or greater than the risk that the amniocentesis will
inadvertently abort the fetus.59 In other words, the medical community has
concluded that women should be offered amniocentesis only when the risk
of detecting a Down syndrome fetus equals or exceeds the risk of aborting
a normal fetus. While this may be a reasonable balance to draw, it is also
the case that many women may have very strong feelings about not having
a Down syndrome child and may therefore wish to undergo amniocentesis
unless the risk of an abortion is five, ten, or even twenty times the risk
of giving birth to a Down syndrome fetus. These women might reason
that they can always try to become pregnant again, but they cannot undo
the birth of a child with Down syndrome. Reasonable people can differ
on the appropriate place to draw the balance, and medical expertise does
not help us settle the question.
b. Relatedness of the Need for Treatment to the Person's Disability
The University Hospital court also suggested that a denial of treatment
raises discrimination concerns only when the person's need for treatment
is independent of the person's disability.60 According to the court, when
the condition requiring treatment is related to the disability, "it will rarely,
if ever, be possible to say with certainty that a particular decision was
'discriminatory."61 Thus, for example, if a blind person is denied a kidney
transplant on account of her congenital blindness, there might be unlawful
discrimination, since the need for a kidney transplant is independent of
the blindness. However, if a child with a severe developmental disability
is denied a surgical procedure to treat the disability, there would be no
58Joe Leigh Simpson, Genetic Counseling and Prenatal Diagnosis, in OBSTETRICS:
NORMAL AND PROBLEM PREGNANCIES 269, 278 (Steven G. Gabbe et al. eds., 2d ed. 1991).
59 Susan P. & Stephen G. Pauker, Prenatal Diagnosis-Why Is 35 a Magic Number?,
330 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1151 (1994).60 See University Hospital, 729 F.2d at 156 ("[The Rehabilitation Act] prohibits
discrimination against a handicapped individual only where the individual's handicap is
unrelated to ... the services in question."); Crossley, supra note 15, at 1648-50.
61 University Hospital, 729 F.2d at 157.
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unlawful discrimination because the need for the surgical procedure arises
out of the disability itself. This distinction between conditions that are
independent of the disability and those that are related to the disability is
made on the ground that anti-discrimination law is designed to ensure that
similarly situated persons receive the same treatment. When the need for
treatment arises out of the disability, as when a severely disabled newborn
needs a surgical procedure, there is no similarly situated person without
the disability who needs the same surgical procedure.62
There are important problems with this approach. First, it leads to
unacceptable distinctions based on quality of life. Consider the example
of a newborn with Down syndrome who has an intestinal blockage that
can be surgically eliminated. If untreated, the blockage would result in
the infant's death. Intestinal blockage is more than 100 times as common
in newborns with Down syndrome than in other newborns. 63 Thus, under
the relatedness approach, it would be permissible to deny surgery to the
Down syndrome child even though relief of the blockage would allow the
child to live a life with considerable benefits for decades.
The relatedness approach is also problematic because of its narrow
scope. Because the human body is a highly integrated organism and not
compartmentalized into relatively independent parts, a disabling illness
generally has a wide-ranging effect on that person's needs for medical
treatment. Accordingly, situations of complete independence between a
disability and a need for treatment are rare, and much discrimination
would be deemed lawful under the relatedness standard.64
c. The "Bona Fide Medical Judgment" Standard
The University Hospital opinion also suggests a third justification for
denying treatment-an alternative conception of the relatedness approach.
Under the "bona fide medical judgment standard,' the issue is not whether
the person's need for treatment is related to the disability but whether the
ability to benefit from treatment is related to the disability. On this reading,
the University Hospital court upheld the denial of treatment on the ground
62 See Bowen v. American Hospital Association, 476 U.S. 610, 654-55 (1986) (White,
O'Connor, and Brennan, JJ., dissenting).63While fewer than 1 in 1000 persons are born with an obstruction of their small
intestine, see Deborah C. Rubin, Small Intestine: Anatomy and Structural Anomalies, in
TEXTBOOK OF GASTROENTEROLOGY 1555, 1567 (Tadataka Yamada et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995),
more than 1 in 10 infants with Down syndrome are born with such an obstruction. MARK
SELIKOWITZ, DOWN SYNDROME: THE FACTS 85-86 (1990).
"Physicians could, for example, deny dialysis or laser treatment to prevent loss of
vision to patients with diabetes. Cf. Crossley, supra note 15, at 1649-50 (discussing how
HIV-infected children might not be protected against unfair denials of immunization since
the decision to immunize would likely be affected by the child's compromised immune
status).
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that the decision was a "bona fide medical judgment" in which the denial
of treatment on the basis of the baby's disabilities was not based on
characteristics of the baby that were irrelevant to the treatment decision
but on medical implications of the disability that were critical to the
decision whether treatment was medically indicated. It was because the
disabilities gave the baby such a grim prognosis that it did not make sense
to provide certain treatments to the baby; there would not be sufficient
benefits from the treatments to justify their use.65 Similarly, a federal
district court has indicated that, if a person's HIV-related disease decreases
the person's ability to benefit from ear surgery, then the HIV disease may
disqualify the person as a candidate for the surgery.66 In other words, the
patients are not being denied treatment because of invidious prejudice or
even unthinking inattention to the needs of the disabled but because of
relevant "medical effects" of their sicknesses. 67 Proponents of this view
might argue that it is more like refusing to hire a blind person to drive a
bus rather than like refusing to hire a blind person to be a telephone
operator. As long as the decisionmakers give appropriate, individualized 6S
weight to the medical implications of the person's disability and do not
use it as a pretext to discriminate, they would not be guilty of unlawful
discrimination.69
65 Physician prognostications in these cases may be inaccurate. In one case, physicians
predicted that the baby would have no self-awareness, would experience only pain, and
would live for only a short time, yet an article recently reported that the child was 10
years old and attending a school for developmentally disabled children. See B.D. Colen,
What Ever Happened to Baby Jane Doe?, 24(3) HASTINGS CENTER REP. 2 (1994).66 Glanz v. Vernick, 756 F Supp. 632, 638 (D. Mass. 1991).67 See Crossley, supra note 15, at 1650-55 (arguing for this approach and calling it
"The Medical Effects Approach"); Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82
CAL. L. REV. 1449, 1515 n.205 (1994).680Ganz, 756 F. Supp. at 638.
691n the Baby Doe cases, the parents declined surgery for their children. Johnson v.
Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1491 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. University Hospital,
729 F.2d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 1984). Subsequent court decisions have suggested that the Baby
Doe courts found no unlawful discrimination because there was no denial of treatment by
the physicians or hospitals; rather, the babies were not treated because their parents
decided against treatment. See In re Baby "K", 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1028 (E.D. Va. 1993),
aff'd, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994); Glanz v. Vernick, 750 F.
Supp. 39, 46 (D. Mass. 1990). However, the Baby Doe opinions are written as if treatment
were denied by the health care providers. Moreover, as Justice White wrote, anti-discrimi-
nation law is concerned not only with physicians' decisions but also their advice or
recommendations to patients. Bowen v. American Hospital Association, 476 U.S. 610, 653
n.7 (1986) (White, J., dissenting). Patients and families are heavily influenced by the
recommendations of their physicians. Indeed, in one of the cases, parents who originally
agreed with the physicians' recommendations later brought a suit charging unlawful
discrimination. Johnson, 971 F.2d at 1491. In many cases, the patients and families will
not realize that the physician's recommendations may reflect value judgments about quality
of life with which the patient or family disagrees. See, e.g., Johnson, 971 F.2d at 1491;
see also David Orentlicher, The Illusion of Patient Choice in End of Life Decisions, 267
JAMA 2101 (1992); David Orentlicher, The Limitations of Legislation, 53 MD. L. REv.
1255, 1280-88 (1994) (both articles discussing studies that have demonstrated that
[Vol. 31
Rationing of Health Care
In terms of the example of organ transplantation, the bona fide medi-
cal judgment standard suggests that courts will invoke the ADA to protect
persons from eligibility criteria that give them less access to organ trans-
plants because of their illnesses when these persons would do as well with
a transplant as other people. For instance, a transplant program cannot
deny a liver transplant because of alcoholism if, as some studies suggest,
70
transplanted organs survive as long in alcoholics as they do in non-alco-
holics.
3. Failure of Current Judicial Interpretations to Adhere to the
Principle of Reasonable Accommodations
Each of the aforementioned standards suffers from a failure to rec-
ognize a fundamental element of the ADA: the principle of reasonable
accommodations. 71 The principle is incorporated in the ADA for private
hospitals and other public accommodations operated by private entities as
follows: unlawful discrimination exists if the entity fails "to make reason-
able modifications in [its practices] when such modifications are neces-
sary to afford [its services] to individuals with disabilities, unless ...
making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of [the
services]." 72 The entity must also make auxiliary services available to
ensure disabled persons equal access to the entity's services unless doing
so would "fundamentally alter the nature" of the services or "would result
in an undue burden?' 73
The principle of reasonable accommodations goes beyond the re-
quirement that employers, providers of public services, and private opera-
tors of public accommodations refrain from discrimination when a per-
son's disabilities are irrelevant. The principle also requires that affirmative
steps be taken to integrate persons with disabilities more fully into society
even when their disabilities compromise their ability to work or their
ability to benefit from public services or accommodations.
74
decisions about life-sustaining medical treatment reflect the values and preferences of
physicians much more than those of their patients or their surrogate decisionmakers).70 See, e.g., Shashi Kumar et al., Orthotopic Liver Transplantation for Alcoholic Liver
Disease, 11 HEPATOLOGY 159 (1990). But see Steven Schenker et al., Should Patients with
End-Stage Alcoholic Liver Disease Have a New Liver?, 11 HEPATOLOGY 314 (1990).
71 For example, when Crossley argues for the bona fide medical judgment standard,
she concedes its inconsistency with the ADA's principle of reasonable accommodations.
Crossley, supra note 15, at 1654-55 & n.280.
7242 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. 1993).
7342 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (Supp. 1993).
74For example, employers engage in unlawful discrimination if they do not make
"reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or an employee' 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. 1993). Similarly, providers of public services must make "rea-
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The principle of reasonable accommodations recognizes that society
has developed its structures and policies on the basis of the needs of
persons without disabilities. For example, people who use canes may have
trouble crossing the street safely because the walk signal does not last
long enough for them to reach the other side. Likewise, people whose
psychiatric difficulties result in poor compliance with their medical regi-
mens may make them poorer candidates for organ transplantation. 75 In
short, much of the disadvantage of a disability is not inherent in the
disability itself but is a result of social attitudes, policies, and institutions
erected around the norm of a person without disabilities. 76 Accordingly,
if we prohibited discrimination only when disabilities had no effect on a
person's functioning, we would do nothing to counteract the fact that our
social structures are inherently biased against persons with disabilities.
Treating people with disabilities equally when they start out with an unfair
disadvantage simply perpetuates the original disadvantage. Thus, the prin-
ciple of reasonable accommodations requires that reasonable steps be
taken to counteract the inherent biases of social structure.77
As the Supreme Court has observed, the principle of reasonable
accommodations is an integral part of the legal framework protecting the
sonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices" to enable persons with disabilities
to receive their services or participate in their programs. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (Supp.
1993); see also Peters, supra note 7, at 507-08 (describing the principle of reasonable
accommodations).
75Psyehiatrie illness interferes with a person's ability to follow routines and keep
schedules. Consequently, people with psychiatric illness usually need more external
guidance in exercising control over their lives. These individuals could have better
compliance with medical regimens if they were able to live in a more structured environment.
Yet our society has evolved with a low level of external structure because most people can
muster high levels of internal structure. Had we designed our society with the needs of
the disabled in mind, we would have a society in which disabilities had much less of an
impact on a person's ability to function.76 See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW 21-22 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets Don't Stop Discrimination,
in REASSESSING CIVIL RIGHTS 22, 33 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1991) (discussing
how "markets incorporate the norms and practices of advantaged groups").
77 Race-based affirmative action programs apply this principle in recognizing that it is
not enough simply to cease racial discrimination; it is also necessary to compensate for
the effects of past discrimination. Glen Loury, Why Should We Care About Group
Inequality?, 5 Soc. PHIL & PoL'Y 249 (1987). Similarly, the Supreme Court has upheld
federal statutes that compensate for past discrimination against women when the statutes
have been challenged as discriminating against men. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S.
313, 318 (1977) (allowing Congress to exclude more lower-earning years for women than
for men when calculating average monthly wages for Social Security retirement benefits
in order to compensate for historical gender discrimination in well-paying jobs); Schlesin-
ger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975) (allowing Congress to give female officers in the
Navy a longer period of active service than male officers before mandatory discharge for
lack of promotion, because women generally had fewer opportunities for the kind of
accomplishments that would lead to a promotion).
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disabled from discrimination. Quoting from the legislative record of the
Rehabilitation Act,78 the Court in Alexander v. Choate9 recounted the
evidence of congressional intent to eradicate the discrimination caused by
social structures, such as architectural and transportation barriers, and
other social arrangements, such as job qualification criteria, that are de-
signed around a norm of a person without disabilities, albeit without any
actual intent to disfavor those with disabilities.80 Indeed, the Choate Court
observed that Congress viewed discrimination against the disabled as
being caused most often not by invidious animus but by society's indif-
ference to the needs of disabled persons.81
4. Recognizing the Principle of Reasonable Accommodations
a. The Principle of Reasonable Accommodations and Current
Judicial Interpretations
In spite of the Choate Court's recognition of a principle of reasonable
accommodations in the disabilities context, the principle has received
minimal consideration in decisions involving health care rationing.82 Instead,
as the Choate opinion suggests, the courts have developed the principle
of reasonable accommodations primarily in non-medical contexts.83 For
example, the Tenth Circuit has held that primary public schools must
provide special education services and adopt modifications of their educa-
tional programs to ensure that children with disabilities receive an educa-
78The interpretations of the Rehabilitation Act are important because the ADA
includes a provision stating that it should be construed to apply no more lenient a standard
than that applied under the Rehabilitation Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (Supp. 1993); see
also Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that "whether suit is filed
against a federally-funded entity under the Rehabilitation Act or against a private employer
under the ADA, the substantive standards for determining liability are the same").
79469 U.S. 287 (1985) (upholding Tennessee's 14-day annual cap on coverage for
hospitalization under Medicaid against a claim that the cap amounted to discriminatory
rationing by service against persons with disabilities, given the greater need of such
persons for hospitalization).
801d. at 296-97.
81 d at 295-96.
82This lack of consideration appears to reflect both the paucity of rationing cases
decided under anti-discrimination law and the view that anti-discrimination law has little
to say about rationing by patient. The Choate case is the only Supreme Court case to
address rationing decisions on substantive grounds. The Court summarily rejected the
plaintiffs' reasonable accommodation claim on the ground that their proposed remedy
would impose unduly burdensome administrative costs but provided little evidence for
such a holding. Choate, 469 U.S. at 306-09.
83 See, e.g., New Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico, 678 F.2d 847
(10th Cir. 1982); Prewitt v. United States Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981).
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tion appropriate to their needs, as long as the financial burden is not
excessive.84
If the principle of reasonable accommodations were applied to health
care rationing decisions as it has been applied in non-medical contexts,
health care programs might have to provide support services that would
allow certain patients to receive benefits they might not otherwise receive.
For example, organ recipients have many responsibilities to ensure sur-
vival of their organs. Those responsibilities might not be feasible for a
disabled person alone, but they might become feasible if the organ trans-
plant program provided support services. Some transplant centers have
been able to overcome compliance problems by having frequent contact
with their patients. 85 If interpreted as it has been in non-medical contexts,
reasonable accommodations would likely require the provision of these
support services as long as it would not be unduly burdensome for the
transplant program to do so.86
b. Recognizing the Effects of Social Forces on Disabilities
Through the Principle of Reasonable Accommodations
A more expansive interpretation of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act
would better realize the purposes of the principle of reasonable accommo-
dations. The principle of reasonable accommodations recognizes two im-
portant truths. First, it recognizes that disability is not simply an intrinsic
characteristic of a person but is the result of the interaction between a
person's intrinsic qualities and the environment. 87 Second, the principle
recognizes that the environment is shaped not simply by natural, inevitable
forces but also has been shaped to serve the interests of some segments
of society at the expense of others. The socio-political environment cannot
84 New Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 678 F.2d at 854-55.
85 See S. Takemoto & P.I. Terasaki, A Comparison of Kidney Transplant Survival in
White and Black Recipients, 21 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 3865, 3866 (1989).
16 See Peters, supra note 7, at 529 (arguing that the principle of reasonable accommo-
dations may impose such a requirement); cf. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F CHILDRESS,
PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 295-96 (3d ed. 1989) (arguing that principles of justice
may require the provision of support services to organ recipients).87See JEROME E. BICKENBACH, PHYSICAL DISABILITY AND SOCIAL POLICY 11 (1993).
This is not to say that there is no measurable biological component to disability. Indeed,
persons with disabilities often do have an identifiable abnormality, but the mere existence
of a biological component does not tell us what its functional effects will be. Id. at 14.
Accordingly, in its definitions, the United Nations distinguishes between the existence of
an abnormality of a person's structure, an "impairment" and the effects that result from
the interaction of the abnormality with the person's environment, a "handicap!' Susan
Wendell, Toward a Feminist Theory of Disability, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES IN MEDICAL
ETHICS 63, 65 (Helen B. Holmes & Laura M. Purdy eds., 1992) (quoting United Nations
definitions).
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always be justified by the operation of neutral or objective principles or
by principles that are otherwise morally valid.88
Indeed, there is nothing "natural" or ineluctable about the fact that
most aspects of socio-political organization respond primarily to the needs
of persons without disabilities,89 just as there is nothing inevitable about
the fact that the post office and many businesses cease operations on
Sunday, the Christian Sabbath, rather than on Saturday, the Jewish Sab-
bath, or Friday, the Moslem Sabbath. Social norms develop not because
they are pre-ordained, but because they serve the needs of social groups
that are dominant either in numbers or power.
Often, social arrangements develop around a social norm of a person
without disabilities because of inattention to the needs of persons with
disabilities. In addition, in some cases, society purposefully creates its
institutions for the convenience of persons without disabilities while aware
of the hardship imposed on persons with disabilities. For example, it is
commonly the case that mentally retarded persons are perceived to be
physically unattractive. Yet, with a little assistance in grooming, many of
these individuals can take on an "attractive" appearance. 90 Some institu-
tions for the mentally retarded have intentionally neglected the grooming
of their wards to discourage them from entering into romantic or sexual
relationships. 91 The operators find that such relationships complicate their
work; in addition, non-retarded persons are often unwilling to permit
sexual or romantic activity by retarded persons.92 In short, persons without
disabilities may compromise the interests of persons with disabilities for
their own convenience and psychological comfort.
How a social norm develops, then, may depend much more on con-
siderations of popularity or political power than upon alternative visions
of distributive justice that often have greater moral weight. Because
socio-political forces frequently exacerbate the impact of a disability
without sufficient moral justification, anti-discrimination law requires
88See Sunstein, Why Markets Don't Stop Discrimination, in REASSESSING CIVIL
RIGHTS, supra note 76, at 33.
89 See, e.g., Harlan Hahn, The Politics of Physical Differences: Disability and Dis-
crimination, 44 J. SOCIAL ISSUES 39, 40 (1988); Wendell, supra note 87, at 63, 67-70
(claiming that prior policy decisions create a subsequent environment with discriminatory
effects on people with disabilities).
90 CAROLYN L. VASH, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DISABILITY 72-73 (1981) (describing an
experiment with mentally retarded persons who were perceived to be unattractive but, after
20 minutes of grooming and coaching, were perceived as attractive).
9 1 1d.
9 2 See id.; see also Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding the steriliza-
tion of a mentally retarded woman); Robert L. Hayman, Jr., Presumptions of Justice:
Law, Politics, and the Mentally Retarded Parent, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1201, 1243-47
(1990) (arguing that presumptions about the retarded lead to assumptions about parental
fitness).
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modifications of social policies to ameliorate the deleterious effects of
socio-political forces on disability. 93
(i) How the Magnification Effect of Social Forces on Disability
Influences Rationing Decisions
Because social organization can aggravate the impact of disabilities,
socio-political factors will likely compromise the access to health care of
persons with disabilities when health care is rationed. Allocation decisions
will be based both on length and quality of life. Some treatments will be
funded because they can save lives; others will be funded because they
can diminish pain or improve the ability of patients to think, walk, or
breathe. Moreover, the greater the improvement in quality or length of
life from a treatment, the more likely that the treatment will be funded.
Social organization may act on this relationship between quality of life
and likelihood of funding to the detriment of persons with disabilities.
The more that social organization exacerbates the impact of a disability
on a person's quality of life, the more the quality of life resulting from
the disability will be diminished. As a result, persons with disabilities will
often receive a smaller improvement in quality of life from treatment than
persons without disabilities and will therefore be less likely to receive
funding for treatment.
The relationship between rationing and disability reflects not only the
effects on disability of concrete social structures, it also reflects the effects
of disability on people's perceptions. 94 As the Supreme Court observed in
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, discrimination on the basis of
disability exists in large part because persons without disabling diseases
often have unfounded views about such illnesses. 95 For example, people
have been known to avoid persons with cancer out of fear that the cancer
was contagious. 96 This example demonstrates that people become disabled
not only because they are actually hampered by an illness but also because
other people treat them as if they are disabled.97 Perceptions about dis-
93See Sunstein, Why Markets Don't Stop Discrimination, in REASSESSING CIVIL
RIGHTS, supra note 76, at 34-36 (arguing that one of the purposes of anti-discrimination
law is to eliminate the caste-like effects of social arrangements being structured around
the norms of advantaged persons).94See Hahn, The Politics of Physical Differences, supra note 89, at 42-45; HARLAN
HAHN, THE ISSUE OF EQUALITY: EUROPEAN PERCEPTIONS OF EMPLOYMENT FOR DISABLED
PERSONS 12 (1984) (both works observing that persons with disabilities are subject to
discrimination because of economic and social systems that favor able-bodied persons and
because able-bodied persons feel psychologically threatened by the existence of persons
with disabilities).
95480 U.S. 273, 284-85 (1987).96 Susan Sontag, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR 6 (1978). Persons with HIV infection may
also suffer ostracism due to exaggerated fears of contagion.97 HAHN, ISSUE OF EQUALITY, supra note 94, at 15. Similarly, a study of persons with
[Vol. 31
Rationing of Health Care
ability are relevant to rationing decisions because such decisions often
hinge on estimates of the quality of life enjoyed by persons with disabili-
ties. When persons without disabilities are asked to estimate the quality
of life of persons with disabilities, their estimates are often considerably
lower than the ratings given by persons with disabilities when they are
asked to evaluate their own quality of life.98 This underestimation may
cause those without disabilities to assign less benefit to, and therefore less
funding for, treatments for persons with disabling conditions.99
(ii) The Causation Effect of Social Forces on Disability
Not only can social factors magnify the impact that a disabling
condition has on a person's ability to function, but the very existence of
a disabling condition may be a consequence of the commissions or omis-
sions of society.
Social forces cause disability by commission when environmental
pollution leads to lung diseases or cancers, when lead-based paint dam-
ages the neurological systems of children, or when unchecked violence
results in traumatic injury.
Social organization causes disability by omission when priorities are
established for medical research and treatment. Some illnesses, such as
heart disease and cancer, are the subject of vast research expenditures,
while other illnesses receive disproportionately little federal research fund-
ing.100 Patients with intensively studied diseases are much more likely to
be saved from disabling symptoms than patients with neglected diseases.
In addition, efforts to develop treatment for a particular illness often focus
visual impairment suggests that the extent to which a visually impaired person's activities
are compromised may depend less on the person's actual degree of visual impairment than
on the fact that the attitudes of others toward visual impairment socialize the person into
the role of a blind person. See ROBERT A. SCOTT, THE MAKING OF BLIND MEN: A STUDY
OF ADULT SOCIALIZATION 71-89, 105-21 (1969).
98 See, e.g., Norman F. Boyd et al., Whose Utilities for Decision Analysis?, 10 MED.
DEC. MAKING 58 (1990); Arnold M. Epstein et al., Using Proxies to Evaluate Quality of
Life: Can They Provide Valid Information About Patients' Health Status and Satisfaction
with Medical Care?, 27 MED. CARE S91 (1989); Robert A. Pearlman & Richard F.
Uhlmann, Quality of Life in Chronic Diseases: Perceptions of Elderly Patients, 43 J.
GERONTOLOGY M25 (1988).
99 For example, it is less likely that chemotherapy or cardiac surgery will be provided
to persons who are mentally disabled than to persons who have average intellectual skills.
See, e.g., In re Phillip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980)
(withholding corrective surgery for heart defect from a Down syndrome child); Superin-
tendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977) (with-
holding chemotherapy for leukemia from mentally retarded patient); see also Levenson &
Olbrisch, supra note 24, at 318.
100In fiscal year 1989, for example, federal spending for research on, education about,
and prevention of cancer exceeded that for Alzheimer's disease by a factor of 10
($1.45 billion vs. $127 million). See Victor F. Zonana, Staggering Costs; AIDS Care:
Who'll Pick up the Bill?, L.A. TWn.s, Aug. 7, 1989, at Metro 1.
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on a treatment that is effective only for some of those with the illness,
leaving the most disabled without any therapeutic option. Experience with
heart transplant as a treatment for end-stage heart disease demonstrates
this type of bias. Some patients have such severely compromised cardiac
function that a heart transplant appears to be the only treatment left, yet
they do not have high enough priority on the waiting list to receive a
transplant.' 0 ' Recent research on these patients has shown that unusually
aggressive medical therapy is much more effective than previously used
regimens and that the newly aggressive approach often obviates the need
for transplantation. t0 2 Had fewer resources been devoted to developing
surgical approaches that benefit only certain patients and more resources
been devoted to medical therapies that benefit all patients with severe
heart disease, effective treatment would likely have become available
sooner to a much broader range of patients who are more severely dis-
abled by their illnesses. 03 Moreover, when treatments are developed for
a particular disease, they are often based on the norm of a patient without
any coexisting illnesses. As a result, patients with multiple illnesses are
less able to benefit from treatment. For example, persons with chronic
lung disease are less likely to be viewed as appropriate candidates for
coronary artery surgery. These situations are analogous to the phenome-
non of medical treatments often being more effective for men than women.
Because research studies have typically used only men as subjects, the
101 The waiting list for a heart transplant greatly exceeds the number of hearts available
for transplantation, so most persons who would benefit from a transplant never receive
one. See Roger NV. Evans, Need, Demand, and Supply in Organ Transplantation, 24
TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 2152 (1992) (indicating that, in 1990, over 45,000
persons needed a heart or heart-lung transplant, but that there were fewer than 4500 organ
donors).
'
02See Sandra Blakeslee, High Doses of Drugs Forestall Heart Transplants, N.Y.
Tihins, Oct. 20, 1992, at C3.
103 It is not surprising that greater efforts have been devoted to developing surgical
rather than non-surgical treatments. Historically, insurers have reimbursed physicians at
much higher rates for performing tests or procedures than for prescribing medications. See
Robert A. Berenson, Payment Approaches and the Cost of Care, in PAYING THE DOCTOR:
HEALTH POLICY AND PHYSICIAN REIMBURSEMENT 63, 65-67 (Jonathan D. Moreno ed.,
1991). Yet there is nothing "natural" or inevitable about the higher reimbursement rates
for tests and procedures. See Jon R. Gabel & Michael A. Redisch, Alternative Physician
Payment Methods: Incentives, Efficiency, and National Health Insurance, 57 MILBANK
MEMORIAL FUND QUARTERLY/HEALTH AND SOCIETY 338, 348, 352-54 (1979) (observing
that insurers have traditionally reimbursed technologically oriented and institutionally
based physician services more generously than primary care services). The higher rates
arose at least in part for idiosyncratic reasons. See Mark S. Blumberg, Provider Price
Charges for Improved Health Care Use, in HEALTH HANDBOOK 1049, 1065, 1086 (George
K. Chacko ed., 1979). Moreover, the rate differentials have since been perpetuated by
private and public health care insurers because insurers have tended to reimburse physi-
cians on the basis of their usual and customary fees. See Gabel & Redisch, Alternative
Physician Payment Methods, at 339-40.
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treatments developed are based on a male model and are often not as
effective for treating women. 1°4
Social organization also affects the cost of treatment. When fewer
resources are devoted to the understanding and treatment of a particular
condition, there is less to offer patients with that condition, and treatment
of that condition often ends up costing more. Cost of care is essentially
the flip-side of benefit of care. Accordingly, just as considerations of
medical benefit are not "neutral" measures for allocation decisions, nei-
ther are considerations of cost.
All of the disadvantaging aspects of social structure that this Article
has discussed may act to limit a disabled person's access to organ trans-
plants. If there had been more aggressive efforts in the past to treat
disabling conditions targeted by eligibility criteria for transplantation,
they would not now have as much effect as they do on organ transplant
success. Unfortunately, much of the neglect of certain diseases reflects the
invidious prejudices that people have about those diseases. Psychiatric
illnesses have not often been viewed as real illnesses, for example; other
diseases, like obesity, have been ignored because they have been viewed
as self-inflicted.
(iii) A New Standard for the Principle of Reasonable
Accommodations-Destructured Disability
If courts gave adequate recognition to the principle of reasonable
accommodations, they would conclude that even meaningful medical dif-
ferences among organ transplant candidates cannot form the basis for
preferring one person over another, and that meaningful medical differ-
ences may have resulted from past invidious bias or other unfair biases
in social structure. To compensate for these biases, this Article proposes
a destructured disability standard which would require physicians to dis-
count the significance of medical differences among patients when allo-
cating organs for transplantation.
The difficult question is how much physicians should discount medi-
cal differences among patients. It is impossible to measure the precise
effects of unfair biases or to know what the world would look like if
society had evolved with fairer policies and structures. Nevertheless, we
must make some efforts to overcome the biases of social structure. That
we cannot tailor our remedy to the problem precisely should not prevent
us from trying to remedy it as best we can.
104See, e.g., Marcia Angell, Caring for Women's Health-What Is the Problem?, 329
NEW ENG. J. MED. 271 (1993); Milo Gibaldi, Drug Development and Women: An
Overview, 12 PHARMACOTHERAPY 365 (1992); Nanette K. Wenger, Cardiovascular Drugs:
The Urgent Need for Studies in Women, 46 J. AM. MED. WOMEN'S Ass'N 117 (1991).
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To some extent, the statutory language provides an answer. The ADA
and Rehabilitation Act do not require that employers, governments, or
private operators of public accommodations undertake unlimited measures
to accommodate persons with disabilities. The obligation to accommodate
ceases when the accommodations would be unduly burdensome or would
result in a fundamental alteration of the workplace, service, or public
accommodation.0 5 This limit on the obligation to undertake reasonable
accommodations likely reflects a tension between the egalitarian spirit of
anti-discrimination law and utilitarian concerns. It also undoubtedly reflects
the fact that not all effects of disability are a consequence of biased social
structure, and that in some cases, the debilitating effects of a disability
result primarily from its inherent nature.10 6 In the context of rationing by
patient, a court would likely limit the obligation to accommodate when
medical care provided minimal benefit and did so at a high financial
cost. 0 7
These considerations suggest the following "destructured disability"
standard for the principle of reasonable accommodations: if a disabling
illness seriously compromises a person's ability to benefit from an organ
transplant, a physician could deny the person an organ. Otherwise, the
physician should give the person the same opportunity as other candidates
to benefit from a transplant. In other words, if the disabling illness pre-
vents the person from realizing a reasonable minimum level of benefit
from treatment, it would be permissible for physicians to deny the treat-
ment to the patient because of the illness. Thus, if a person's lung disease
prevents the person from gaining a reasonable minimum level of benefit
from a heart transplant, the person could be denied a new heart.
What would constitute a reasonable minimum level of benefit, like
many other legal standards, is not easily reduced to a precise formula.
Courts will have to rely to some extent on physician discretion, but it is
also important that they set the threshold low enough to ensure that it
provides meaningful protection for persons with disabilities. Thus if an
organ transplant program excluded persons whose coexisting illnesses
prevented them from gaining more than a few months of benefit from an
organ, there should be no problem with the exclusion. If, however, a
105 See supra notes 72 and 73 and accompanying text.
1061For example, an anencephalic infant's lack of a brain and, thus, consciousness
would be a devastating disability under any social structure. Steven G. Gabbe et al.,
OBSTETRICS NORMAL AND PROBLEM PREGNANCIES 291-92 (2d ed. 1991) (describing the
development and prospects of anencephaly).
107 Cf Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that, given govern-
mental fiscal constraints, reasonable accommodation does not require a county to grant an
employee extended paid leave while the employee attempts to control his medical
problems); Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473, 478 (lth Cir. 1983) (holding that
employer was not obligated to have other workers assist disabled employee with his tasks
given the small staff and limited resources).
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program excluded persons who would gain a few years of benefit on the
ground that other persons would gain even more, that kind of exclusion
should not be permitted.
This is not to say that the person with the coexisting disabling illness
will necessarily receive the organ transplant when that person's coexisting
illness is eliminated from consideration. There will not be enough organs
for everyone who would receive more than a reasonable minimum level
of benefit. Accordingly, some method must be used to distinguish among
the different qualifying candidates for an organ transplant. The most
promising option is to employ some type of equal opportunity approach,
such as a lottery system that could be used to choose among all patients
who would gain more than a reasonable minimum level of benefit.108
Random selection and similar equal opportunity mechanisms are valu-
able for at least two reasons. First, as indicated, they reduce the possibility
that rationing decisions will be based on unjustified effects of socio-
political factors on persons with disabilities. Second, if decisionmakers
realize that they cannot fully control the outcome of rationing decisions
and that therefore treatments they might need when they become patients
might be denied, they might be more generous in allocating resources for
health care coverage. Decisionmakers and others with disproportionate
influence will not be able to game the system and skew the allocation of
resources toward their own particular needs. 10 9 Equal opportunity mecha-
nisms, in short, bring us closer to approximating the veil of ignorance. 10
1081 t is more difficult to use a random selection method for general rationing than
with allocation of kidneys or other organs. Since organs have to be allocated quickly to
be usable, there is a well-defined list of potential recipients. With general rationing, on
the other hand, current patients are in competition with unascertained future patients.
Several measures could help overcome this problem. First, the priority list for patients
could be developed by using a lottery to rank month and date of birth, as with the draft
lotteries. Future patients, then, would be assigned a place in the ranking based on their
month and date of birth. Second, based on historical trends, it is possible to estimate how
many patients would need different kinds of care each month. Funds could be budgeted
in a way to ensure that there were resources for as many patients in December as in
January.
109 See Hank Greely, The Equality of Allocation by Lot, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
113, 118-20 (1977).
"
0 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). Lotteries have been criticized as a
mechanism for allocating scarce medical resources on the ground that it is irresponsible
to rely on mere chance to make such momentous decisions and that people will feel
dehumanized if they are subject to the arbitrariness of a lottery. See, e.g., GUIDO
CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 134 (1978); Elhauge, supra note 67, at
1500-02. Yet it would be even more irresponsible to allocate limited resources on the basis
of criteria that incorporate unfair biases against certain people. It is also more dehuman-
izing to deny people care because of unfair biases than because of the operation of a
lottery. I do not advocate a lottery as a better approach than one based on some morally
valid criteria for choosing among different patients; I simply argue that, in the absence of
an approach that relies on morally valid criteria, a lottery should be used.
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Not only would the destructured disability standard help compensate
for society's structural biases against persons with disabilities, it could
also create a strong incentive for society to begin the process of creating
more equitable social structures. Because people want society to realize
the greatest benefit possible from its limited medical resources, they may
try to ensure that the recipients of medical care can gain as much benefit
as possible.
Clearly, this Article's argument can apply to other areas of social
need. Nonetheless, the argument for equitable social structures has special
force in the health care arena. In addition to generating the positive
incentive for society to create more equitable social structures, the de-
structured disability standard does not entail the usual negative incentives
that exist with other programs of welfare distribution. As Einer Elhauge
and Gregory Kavka have observed, we do not have to worry as much
about perverse incentives in health care as we do with other social goods.
When indigent persons are given welfare payments, they may have a
diminished incentive to seek employment. Perverse incentives are of less
concern in allocating health care because it is better to remain healthy
than to become sick to gain greater access to health care."'
Compensating for disabilities differs from compensating for disad-
vantages in education and employment in another important respect. A
program to compensate people who lack certain academic and job skills
would require identification and labeling of those people as lacking such
skills." 2 The stigma that this kind of identification carries would often
outweigh the benefits of the compensatory program. Since disabilities are
often discernible even in the absence of compensatory programs, the
provision of such programs would not add as much in the way of stigma-
tization costs.113
I See Elhauge, supra note 67, at 1486-92 (justifying why health care deserves special
treatment among social goods when deciding society's obligation to provide for those in
need); Gregory S. Kavka, Disability and the Right to Work, 9 Soc. PHIL. & PoL'Y 262,
279 (1992) (discussing how social subsidies to compensate for disability do not encourage
people to seek greater subsidies through increasing their disabilities).
An important problem with incentives remains, however, even in the health care arena.
If health care is subsidized, people will demand excessive levels of care. Consequently,
limits must be placed on the availability of health care, and some alternative mechanism
other than people's willingness to purchase must be used to ensure that too much health
care is not provided. Some countries, like Canada and Great Britain, use waiting lists to
keep health care supply within reasonable limits. See, e.g., Peter C. Coyte et al., Waiting
Tmnes for Knee-Replacement Surgery in the United States and Ontario, 331 Naw ENG. J.
MED. 1068 (1994) (finding that Canadians wait longer than U.S. citizens for knee-replace-
ment surgery).
112 See Kavka, supra note 111, at 282.
"3 Id.
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(iv) Potential Criticisms of the Destructured Disability Standard
At first glance, it appears that the destructured disability standard
would take the principle of reasonable accommodations in a very different
direction from its interpretation in other contexts such as employment. Yet
the application of the principle of reasonable accommodations differs
little between the two contexts. Under the ADA, employers not only must
hire persons with disabilities when they would be as productive in the
workplace as other persons, they must also undertake reasonable accom-
modations to make the workplace accessible to persons with disabilities.
When society requires employers to hire persons with disabilities even
though it costs employers more to do so, society sacrifices some overall
economic benefit in order to ensure greater access to jobs for persons with
disabilities. Similarly, when society requires physicians to give medical
care to persons with disabilities even though there will be less of an
improvement in health, society sacrifices some overall medical benefit in
order to ensure greater access to medical care for persons with disabilities.
In both contexts, there is a trade-off between economic efficiency and
respect for the individual. 114
Another potential problem with the destructured disability standard
is that, while it offers greater protection against discrimination than ex-
isting standards, it does not go far enough to protect against discrimina-
tion arising from biases in social structure. As indicated, the standard
would allow denial of treatment when a disability seriously compromises
that person's ability to benefit from medical care. Yet those who have a
seriously compromised ability to benefit may be the ones who have suf-
fered the most discrimination. The greater the neglect of a particular
disease by society, the more likely it is that people with that disease will
not be helped significantly by medical care.'15 This is an important point,
but its implications cannot realistically be addressed. If persons with little
to gain from treatment are nevertheless entitled to treatment because their
lack of benefit is the result of unfair bias in the past, then there would be
almost no limit on the obligation to accommodate, and the qualification
that the accommodations be "reasonable" would be vitiated. This becomes
particularly apparent in the context of rationing by service. If, simply
because their illness had been socially disfavored, persons with certain
114 In fact, there may not be any loss in overall welfare when society accounts for
social biases against persons with disabilities. While my approach is primarily based on
distributive justice, a utilitarian argument can bring us to the same conclusion. Allocating
medical resources purely in terms of medical benefit ignores other important values, such
as inclusiveness, that contribute to overall social utility. See Kavka, supra note 111, at
268-70.
1151 am indebted to Professor Susan Hoffman Williams, Indiana University School of
Law-Bloomington, for this point.
19961
76 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
psychiatric diseases were entitled to treatment even when the treatment
was costly and provided little benefit, it is hard to see how health care
costs could be reasonably constrained or rationally allocated.
Nevertheless, even with its requirement of a reasonable minimum
level of benefit, the corrective effects of the destructured disability stand-
ard will help those whose diseases have been especially neglected by
society and who therefore gain little benefit from medical care. Because
many people with those diseases will satisfy reasonable minimum thresh-
olds for treatment and will receive treatment under the destructured dis-
ability standard, the incentive for society to create more equitable social
structures would operate to some degree, and society would be more
likely to devote more resources to the understanding and treatment of the
diseases.
B. Rationing by Service
The courts' treatment of rationing by service, like their treatment of
rationing by patient, is also problematic. In the context of rationing by
service, the courts have developed a standard that fails to recognize
adequately not only the principle of reasonable accommodations, but also
the fact that the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, like other anti-discrimina-
tion laws, extend their protections beyond the aggregate level to protect
the individual. Even if a policy does not discriminate against a particular
group, it is not permissible for the policy to discriminate against individu-
als within that group. Discrimination against one person with a disability
cannot be offset by favoritism toward another disabled person. In addition,
while the courts' standard for rationing by service may ensure decent
treatment of persons with disabilities, it does not ensure equal treatment.
To focus the analysis of rationing by service, this Section discusses
the use of fixed caps on the amount of a particular service available to
patients. For example, coverage for mental health treatment in a psychi-
atric hospital might be available for no more than sixty days a year.1 6 For
the sake of simplicity, this Section also assumes that we are dealing with
health care coverage provided by an employer and thus covered by the
employment section of the ADA. 117
1. The Relevant Statutory Provision
At first glance, the ADA would appear to have little to say about fixed
caps on the amount of a medical service covered by employer-provided
insurance. The employment section of the ADA prohibits discrimination
116See, e.g., H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1115(c)(2)(D) (1993).
11742 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (Supp. 1993).
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in compensation and "other terms, conditions, and privileges of employ-
ment" on the basis of the employee's disability.118 This provision suggests
that while employers would not be able to single out persons with dis-
abilities for limitations on services, they would be able to impose limits
that apply to everyone.
Indeed, this view has been taken by the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission ("EEOC") in its guidelines for employer-based health
insurance.119 According to the EEOC, if employer-provided health insur-
ance includes a cap on the amount of a health care service covered, the
cap does not violate the ADA as long it is applied to everyone. Thus, even
if an across-the-board cap has a disparate impact 120 on persons with disabili-
ties, there would be no violation of the ADA.' 21 Under the EEOC view,
the cap would violate the ADA only if it resulted in disparate treatment
of persons with disabilities. 122 For example, if an employer caps hospital
coverage for treatment of HIV infection without imposing a comparable
cap on treatment of other infectious diseases, cancer or heart disease, then
the cap presumptively violates the ADA by selectively imposing the cap
on hospital services on persons who are infected with HIV.123
The problem with the EEOC view is that it misconceives the concept
of equal treatment when it interprets the requirement that employers give
equal treatment in health care coverage to persons with disabilities. Like
any other requirement of equal treatment, the requirement of equal access
to health care benefits does not simply mean that different persons must
receive exactly the same benefits. 124 If we treat people in exactly the same
way, there will be greater hardship on some persons than on others. As
the Supreme Court has observed, "[s]ometimes the greatest discrimination
can lie in treating things that are different as though they were exactly
the same."1 25 For example, if all persons are denied leave for pregnancy,
women suffer greater harm than men.
11842 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. 1993).
119 The guidelines can be found at EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
INTERIM ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE APPLICATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DIs-
ABILITIES ACT OF 1990 TO DISABILITY-BASED DISTINCTIONS IN EMPLOYER PROVIDED
HEALTH INSURANCE, No. N-915.002, reprinted in EEOC COMPL. MAN. (CCH) 6902, at
5313-19 (June 8, 1993).
120 See supra note 44.
121See INTERIM ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 119, at 5315 n.7. The EEOC
cites Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985), for this proposition even though the
Choate Court indicated that the law reaches at least some cases of disparate impact
discrimination against persons with disabilities. Id. at 299.122 See supra note 44.
123See INTERIM ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 119, at 5316.
'
24 See Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL. PUB.
AFF. 185, 185 (1981) (observing that equality can take many different, mutually exclusive
forms).
125Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971) (making this observation in the
context of a challenge to election procedures).
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Consider another example involving two patients with appendicitis.
One patient is otherwise healthy and will be ready for discharge from the
hospital within five days of the appendectomy. The second patient has a
coexisting medical problem (for example, diabetes) that causes recovery
from the surgery to take ten days. 126 If a health plan limited reimburse-
ment across the board to seven days of hospitalization after surgery, the
people with coexisting medical problems would be disadvantaged.
Sometimes we need to take people's differences into account when
deciding how to treat them. To ensure that people are treated as equals,
it is often necessary to treat people differently.127 Consequently, the re-
quirement of equal treatment would invalidate at least some fixed caps on
medical services that had a disparate impact on persons with disabilities,
even though the caps were applied uniformly. 128
2. Judicial Interpretation of the Relevant Statutory Provision:
The Meaningful Access Standard
An alternative approach for rationing by service is suggested by the
Supreme Court's opinion in Alexander v. Choate129 In Choate, disabled
persons challenged a Medicaid provision in Tennessee under the Reha-
bilitation Act.130 In Tennessee, Medicaid would reimburse hospitals for no
more than fourteen days of inpatient care a year for any one Medicaid
recipient. The plaintiffs argued that the fourteen-day limitation would
discriminate against persons with disabilities because such persons are
more likely to need prolonged hospitalization,131 and that the state's across-
126The longer time needed for recovery reflects in part the fact that coexisting medical
problems inevitably complicate a person's health. However, the difference in recovery time
also reflects the fact that socio-political factors may have caused the coexisting medical
problem or that surgeons have developed their techniques for appendectomies on the basis
of a norm of a patient whose appendicitis was not complicated by other medical problems.
127See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1437-39 (2d ed. 1988)
(discussing the distinction between the equal treatment of persons and the treatment of
persons as equals).
12SThe courts' treatment of across-the-board rules that have a disparate impact on
members of minority religious groups also demonstrates the unfairness of the EEOC view.
As Martha Minow has observed, courts have sometimes interpreted unemployment benefits
law to compensate for the fact that social organization often favors persons who are
secular, Catholic, or members of the dominant Protestant faiths. MINow, supra note 76,
at 69; see, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that a state may not deny
unemployment benefits to an individual who declined a job opportunity because it
conflicted with her chosen Sabbath day).
129469 U.S. 287 (1985).
130This case preceded the enactment of the ADA and thus was brought under the
Rehabilitation Act. The provisions of the two laws are nonetheless sufficiently similar for
the distinction to be irrelevant for purposes of this analysis.
131 For example, in 1979-80, among hospitalized Medicaid patients in Tennessee,
27.4% of patients with disabilities needed more than 14 inpatient days while only 7.8%
of patients without disabilities needed more than 14 days. Choate, 469 U.S. at 289-90.
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the-board cap on hospital days would therefore have a disparate impact
on persons with disabilities.
The Supreme Court found no violation of the Rehabilitation Act,
however, because every patient received the same number of hospital days
per year. Drawing on Southeastern Community College v. Davis,132 the
Court held that service rationing that has a disparate impact 33 is permis-
sible as long as persons with disabilities still have "meaningful access"
to their health care program. 134 In Choate, the Court found meaningful
access on the ground that even with the fourteen-day limitation, hospitali-
zation needs would be unsatisfied for only five percent of disabled persons
eligible for Medicaid in Tennessee.135
3. Inadequacies of the Meaningful Access Standard
In one sense, the meaningful access standard seems to be an appro-
priate way to carry out the purposes of the ADA. If everyone is entitled
to meaningful access, then persons with disabilities should be protected
from excessive deprivations of health care benefits.
However, several problems with the meaningful access standard ulti-
mately render it inadequate. An extension of the logic employed by the
Court in Choate indicates just how problematic it is to employ a mean-
ingful access standard. If, as in our example, a health plan limits coverage
for mental health treatment to sixty hospital days per year without capping
hospital days for cancer, heart disease, or other non-psychiatric illnesses,
the limitation would particularly disadvantage persons with psychiatric
disorders. Yet health plan administrators could argue that because these
persons still had full access to other health care services, they had mean-
ingful access to health care generally, even though they might not have
had meaningful access to psychiatric care. Moreover, while the meaning-
132442 U.S. 397 (1979) (finding no violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 when a school required reasonable physical qualifications for admission to a clinical
training program).
133The Choate Court also cited with approval a lower court disparate treatment
decision: Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1979) (upholding Pennsylvania's cap on
coverage for psychiatric illness despite the absence of a comparable cap on coverage for
physical illness).
134 See James V. Garvey, Health Care Rationing and the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990: What Protection Should the Disabled be Afforded?, 68 NoTRE DAME L. REV.
581, 607-10 (1993).
135It is true that patients who needed more than 14 days of hospitalization were not
necessarily deprived of the care they needed. This case was about Medicaid coverage, not
strictly about access to care. Public hospitals provide care to people who have no insurance
coverage, whether private or public. Nevertheless, studies have demonstrated that patients
with no health care coverage fare less well than patients with at least some coverage. See,
e.g., J. Hadley et al., Comparison of Uninsured and Privately Insured Hospital Patients:
Condition on Admission, Resource Use, and Outcome, 265 JAMA 374 (1991).
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ful access standard is compatible with the principle of reasonable accom-
modations, the Supreme Court has applied the standard with minimal
consideration of the obligation to reasonably accommodate. In Choate,
the Court summarily rejected the plaintiffs' alternative to Tennessee's cap
with little support for its rejection and without explaining why it would
not be reasonable for Tennessee to adopt the suggested alternative ap-
proach (which had been adopted by other states). 3 6
Even if courts give meaningful access sufficient substance, it is still
the wrong standard. First, it is not really an equal treatment standard.
Equal treatment requires that whatever level of benefit is provided must
be provided equally. A meaningful access standard, on the other hand,
permits unequal treatment as long as everyone receives a decent minimum
level of the benefit. The meaningful access standard is thus an entitlement
standard. Such a standard would allow an employer or a government to
define two levels of health care benefits: a bare-bones level that provides
meaningful access and that avoids discriminatory impact, and a second
level of benefits which can be allocated in a way that favors persons who
are not disabled (or who are less disabled). This is not only unequal
treatment, it turns the concept of equitable allocation of health care upside
down. Patients who are sicker need greater care but would often receive
less care.
The second problem with a meaningful access standard is that the
fairness of a particular rationing by service decision is judged by its
aggregate impact rather than by its impact on the individual. In Choate,
the fourteen-day cap on hospitalization was upheld because it was ade-
quate for 95% of all disabled persons, producing an overall good result,
even though many individual patients did not receive adequate care. In-
deed, there was inadequate care for 27.4% of patients with disabilities
who .received some hospital care. Rationing by service is a form of
rationing that is fair on average but that may not be fair in an individual
case. As the Supreme Court has observed in cases involving sex-based
discrimination,13 7 the federal statutes prohibiting discrimination do so in
terms of the individual. For example, the ADA states that employers shall
not "discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because
of the disability of such individual,"' 38 and the Rehabilitation Act states
that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability ... shall, solely
136 See supra note 79.137Publie Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989);
Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation
Plans, etc. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983); City of Los Angeles Dep't. of Water and Power
v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978); see Kimberly A. Ackourey, Insuring Americans with
Disabilities: How Far Can Congress Go to Protect Traditional Practices?, 40 EMORY L.J.
1183 (1991).
13842 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
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by reason of her or his disability" be subjected to discrimination. 139 Be-
cause the ADA, like other anti-discrimination laws, operates at the indi-
vidual level, it is essential to employ a standard for interpreting the ADA
that meets individual needs.140
This Article now examines this second problem in more detail, using
the example of a sixty-day cap on mental health treatment in a psychiatric
hospital. With such a limitation, the employer is saying in effect that
treatment beyond sixty days in one year does not tend to provide sufficient
benefit to justify the cost. Yet for many patients who have severe psychi-
atric disorders that do not respond quickly to treatment, treatment beyond
sixty days may be very beneficial. Moreover, it may be more beneficial
than treating less severely affected persons beyond thirty days. With
rationing by service, then, there may be serious inequities in care, with
some patients receiving too little care (those who gain great benefit from
more than sixty days of care) and others receiving too much (those who
gain great benefit from thirty days of care but only mild to moderate
benefit from thirty-one to sixty days of care).
Such a result is both inefficient and unfair to many individuals.
Consequently, courts generally have attempted to prevent this kind of
result when interpreting other anti-discrimination statutes. For example,
in challenges to pension plans that required larger contributions from or
paid smaller annual benefits to women on the ground that women live
longer than men and therefore receive more annual pension payments
after they retire, the Supreme Court has invalidated the differential treat-
ment and insisted that women and men make the same contributions and
receive the same annual payments. 141 As the Court observed, not all women
live longer than men. Treating all women the same thus violates the
requirement that women be treated as individuals.1 42 Just as it is no answer
to the women who pay too much that other women pay too little, it is no
answer to those persons who have unsatisfied health care needs that other
disabled persons receive more than adequate care.
143
13929 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988 & Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
140See Peters, supra note 7, at 531-33. This is not to say that the generally accepted
and reasonable practice of predicting patient outcomes on the basis of general charac-
teristics is totally unacceptable. Doctors, like employers, could not operate if they were
forbidden from acting at least partly on the basis of reasonably valid generalizations. For
example, physicians can only estimate the likelihood that a treatment will succeed for a
patient by considering how the treatment generally works in other, similar patients.
Nevertheless, often more refined predictions can easily be made by subcategorizing classes
of patients.141 See Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983); City of Los
Angeles Dep't. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).14 2Manhart, 435 U.S. at 707-08.
143This point is similar to the employment discrimination law principle that was
developed in Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982). In that case, the Supreme Court
held that employers could not use selection criteria that disfavored a protected minority
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4. An Alternative to the Meaningful Access Standard:
The Principle of Public Consent
In developing an alternative to the meaningful access standard it is
useful to consider approaches that have been suggested by other scholars
for rationing health care. Several commentators who have studied the
question have developed proposals based on a principle of public consent.
These proposals call for rationing only when rationing guidelines result
from the explicit or presumed consent of the public to which those guide-
lines will be applied. Building on the work of David Eddy and Norman
Daniels, for example, Leonard Fleck argues for an "informed democratic
consensus model" in which public representatives would engage in seri-
ous and well-informed deliberations and come to an agreement about the
guidelines that will be used by physicians to ration health care. 44 Observ-
ing that explicit consent is not achievable, Paul Menzel and Ronald Dworkin
recommend a model of presumed consent in which society would adopt
a basic benefits package of health care to which all persons would be
entitled. The basic benefits would be defined by what people would likely
choose for their health care coverage in advance of their actual need for
treatment if confronted at that time with a choice of different possible
benefits packages and their different costs. 45
While these consent-based approaches help resolve many of the difficult
choices in rationing health care, they nevertheless fail to account for the
problem of discrimination against persons with disabilities, particularly
those arising from socio-political factors. 146 Since people must make their
decisions about which treatments should be covered before the need for
treatment actually arises, this approach assumes that everyone starts out
without any disabilities and makes his or her choices from that position.
Accordingly, it cannot help us compensate for the fact that social organi-
zation is skewed by the norm of the person without disabilities. Some
commentators conclude that people will take into account the needs of
persons with disabilities because they could become disabled themselves
at a later date.147 However, people are at different risks for different
at one stage of the promotion process even if the overall result of the process was
non-discriminatory. The requirements of employment discrimination law still would not
be satisfied if favoritism to one member of the minority compensated for discrimination
against another member of the minority. Teal emphasized the fact that employment
discrimination law protects the individual from discrimination. Id. at 453-54.
144Fleck, supra note 6, at 1617-34.
145 See PAUL T. MENZEL, STRONG MEDICINE: THE ETHICAL RATIONING OF HEALTH
CARE 22-36 (1990) (describing a model of presumed consent); Ronald Dworkin, What Is
Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. PUB. AFF. 283, 296-304 (1981); Ronald
Dworkin, Will Clinton's Plan Be Fair?, N.Y REv. BooKs, Jan. 13, 1994, at 20, 22
(advocating in both articles a model based on the insurance principle).
146 MENZEL, supra note 145, at 16.
147See Elhauge, supra note 67, at 1516-17.
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conditions. As a result, a person at low risk for developing a particular
disability will discount the needs of persons with that disability.
Even if we take into account, when defining the basic benefits pack-
age, the fact that some persons will be born with disabilities, the amount
of coverage desired for persons with disabilities will depend on the nature
of socio-political factors. For example, if society has not funded research
into a particular disease and there is little treatment available for the
disease as a result, the basic benefits package is less likely to include
coverage for that disease than for other diseases for which successful
treatments are available. 148 So while rationing proposals based on a model
of public consent offer useful insights into the rationing problem, they do
not tell us how to protect persons with disabilities from unfair denials of
care.
5. An Appropriate Standard for Rationing by Service:
The Destructured Disability Standard
The problems with the EEOC, meaningful access, and public consent
standards can be corrected if rationing by service is judged in essentially
the same way as this Article has suggested for rationing by patient. We
need an equal protection standard, rather than an entitlement standard,
that responds to biases in social structure and that operates at the individ-
ual level. The destructured disability standard for rationing by patient
meets all three of these requirements.
According to the destructured disability standard, a patient may not
be denied a treatment that is available to other patients because of illness
unless the illness seriously compromises the patient's ability to benefit
from the treatment (that is, the illness prevents the patient from receiving
a reasonable minimum level of benefit from the treatment). This is not an
entitlement standard; there is no requirement of any absolute level of care.
It is, however, an equal protection standard because it looks to whether
different patients are receiving the same level of care. In addition, it
responds to biases in social structure by limiting the freedom of physi-
cians to consider the effects of a disability on the patient's ability to
benefit from care before the care can be denied (for example, by giving
due weight to the principle of reasonable accommodations). Finally, it
operates on the individual level by focusing on whether any particular
patient is denied a medical service available to other patients.
Some modification of the destructured disability standard is required
to use it as a standard for service-based, rather than patient-based, ration-
148 See Dworkin, Equality of Resources, supra note 145, at 299 (observing that society
will choose a higher level of insurance for blindness if the money recovered from such
insurance could be used to pay for technologies that offset the disabling effects of
blindness).
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ing. With rationing by patient, the question is whether the patients who
are denied a particular service are as deserving of the service as other
patients. With rationing by service, the question is whether some of the
patients who need the denied service are as deserving of that service as
other patients are who need the services that are offered. In other words,
while with rationing by patient we are comparing two patients who need
the same service, with rationing by service, we are comparing two pa-
tients who need different services.
For rationing by patient, treatment may be denied on account of
illness if the illness prevents the patient from realizing a reasonable
minimum level of benefit from the treatment. The analog for rationing by
service would be to prohibit the denial of a service if some people who
need the service would realize a reasonable minimum level of benefit from
it. 149 With this standard, employers would be unable to cap hospital days
for mental illness at sixty per year if some patients would gain a reason-
able minimum level of benefit from more than sixty days.
Such a standard would not prevent employers from containing their
health care costs. The destructured disability standard does not dictate any
particular level of health care spending. It only requires that, if health care
is provided, it must be provided equitably. Accordingly, if adding care for
persons who previously were denied care would be unaffordable without
making any other changes, then the employer could reallocate its current
health care spending rather than increase its spending. As with rationing
by patient, if care could not be provided to all patients who would gain
more than a reasonable minimum level of benefit, some equal opportunity
mechanism, such as the lottery, could be used to determine whether a
patient would receive care.
One concern with the destructured disability standard is whether
physicians could possibly make the kinds of comparisons required among
patients who need different services. It is relatively simple when dealing
with just one service, like an organ transplant, to compare the needs of
different patients, but it is substantially more complicated to compare the
needs of different patients when they need different services. Neverthe-
less, physicians already make these kinds of comparisons on a daily
basis. 50 Indeed, in some ways, the standard may simplify matters. Physi-
149 Even when an employer could not entirely deny a service, the employer would not
have to offer the service to all who might benefit from it. The employer would still be
able to employ rationing by patient to ration the service.
150 No physician can give every patient all the attention that would benefit the patient.
Time constraints require physicians to limit the amount of time they spend with some of
their patients so they will have a reasonable amount of time for others. See Susan Dorr
Goold & Howard Brody, Rationing Decisions in Managed Care Set-ups: An Ethical
Analysis, in HEALTH CARE CRISIs? THE SEARCH FOR ANSWERS, 135, 137-38 (Robert, I.
Misbin, et al., eds. 1995). Moreover, physicians must allocate their time among patients
with very different conditions. While there will be some overlap in the illnesses affecting
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cians will no longer need to rank their patients in terms of how much they
will benefit from the physician's time. Instead, physicians will need to
determine only whether their patients will gain a reasonable minimum
level of benefit and then give all of those patients an equal opportunity
for the physician's time.
As the preceding discussion suggests, the destructured disability stand-
ard would allow little room for rationing by service. It would be very
difficult to justify the kind of flat caps that have been used, such as
Tennessee's fourteen-day hospital cap or a sixty-day hospital cap for
treatment of mental illness. The kinds of rationing by service that would
be allowed are primarily those that are designed to conserve resources for
persons with disabilities. For example, a denial of coverage for cosmetic
surgery would not be prohibited by the ADA because it does not discrimi-
nate on account of disability, nor does it have a disparate impact on
persons with disabilities.
A limited role for rationing by service would serve not only the goal
of respect for the individual, but it would also serve the goal of efficiency.
Society's limited health care resources will be most efficiently used if
rationing occurs by type of patient. When rationing occurs by service,
health care planners must choose between alternative treatments for a
particular condition, making one treatment available and others unavail-
able. In such cases, planners will choose the treatment that provides the
most benefit on average. For some patients, however, an excluded treat-
ment will provide more benefit than the available treatment. Accordingly,
greater benefit could be realized if the health plan made available a broad
range of treatments and, for each patient, covered the treatment that was
most beneficial for that particular patient (for example, rationing by pa-
tient). 151
C. Inadequacies of Anti-Discrimination Law for the Disabled
Although the destructured disability standard comes closer than ex-
isting standards to fulfilling the purposes of anti-discrimination law, jus-
tice may require even more to ensure fair treatment of all persons. This
the physicians' patients, the patients will also have a variety of illnesses needing different
intensities of treatment.
15' There are some efficiency gains from rationing by service because it may entail
fewer administrative costs than rationing by patient. It is simpler to evaluate the benefit
of a treatment according to the average patient and cover only the treatments that yield a
high average benefit per patient. It is also simpler to decide whether a patient qualifies for
coverage if rationing is done by service rather than by patient. Physicians are accustomed
to rationing their time and treatments by patient, however, and if rationing is done only
partially by service, physicians will still have to make the kinds of comparisons that
rationing by patient entails. Accordingly, it is unlikely that the administrative efficiency
of rationing by service will outweigh the loss of clinical efficiency.
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Article has argued that anti-discrimination law is designed to prevent
decisionmakers from denying medical care to persons with disabilities on
two grounds. First, the law precludes decisionmakers from acting out of
invidious bias to deny care to an individual on account of the person's
disability. Accordingly, persons with disabilities would be assured of
treatment when their disability has no effect on their ability to benefit
from the treatment. Second, the law includes a principle of reasonable
accommodations to compensate for the fact that, when persons with dis-
abilities gain less benefit from treatment than persons without disabilities,
the smaller benefit results not just from the operation of a natural lottery
or some other fair allocation of advantages and disadvantages, but often
from the unfair operation of socio-political forces. Yet even if we could
be sure that one person gained greater benefit from treatment than another
and that this difference resulted from the operation of a natural lottery
rather than arbitrary socio-political constructs, it would not automatically
follow that treatment should be given to the person who would benefit
more from the treatment.
Welfare maximization is an important goal, but it is not the only goal
of medical treatment. 152 The equal worth of each individual suggests that
we may want to give two persons equal opportunity for a particular
treatment even if one would gain a smaller benefit from the treatment
because of a coexisting disability. Indeed, in general, we may want to give
priority when allocating resources among different services and different
patients to the persons whose health is worse to begin with even if those
persons would benefit less from treatment. 153 On many accounts of justice,
there is a fundamental obligation to give some preference to those who
are more disadvantaged when limited resources are being allocated. 54
Conclusion
In the coming years, health care rationing will become increasingly
common. Because of their substantial health care needs and weak political
power, persons with disabilities are at high risk of bearing more than their
fair share of health care cost containment. Accordingly, legal protections
must be in place to prevent unfair discrimination against persons with
disabilities.
Although Congress has enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act
and the Rehabilitation Act to ensure fair treatment of persons with dis-
152See BICKENBACH, supra note 87, at 214-20 (1993); Norman Daniels, Rationing
Fairly: Programmatic Considerations, 7 BioTHics 224, 225-28 (1993); Ronald Dworkin,
What Is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL. PuB. AFF. 185 (1981).
153Daniels, supra note 152, at 228.
154MICHAEL VALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 31-94 (1983); Charles J. Dougherty,
Ethical Values at Stake in Health Care Reform, 268 JAMA 2409, 2410 (1992).
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abilities, judicial interpretations have given inadequate recognition to the
protections embodied in those Acts. When deciding the validity of meas-
ures that involve rationing by patient, courts have properly insisted that
invidious discrimination be eliminated. However, courts have not ade-
quately implemented the statutory principle of reasonable accommoda-
tion, which requires health care decisionmakers to compensate for the
structural biases in society that also disadvantage persons with disabili-
ties.
When deciding the validity of measures that involve rationing by
service, courts have used a meaningful access standard that falls on three
grounds: such a standard is an entitlement standard rather than an equal
protection standard; it does not meet the statutory requirement that the
ADA and Rehabilitation Act operate on the individual level rather than
the group level; and it has been implemented with minimal consideration
of the principle of reasonable accommodations.
It is essential that courts modify their interpretations of existing
anti-discrimination law by adopting the destructured disability standard
for both rationing by patient and rationing by service. Such a standard
responds to current deficiencies in judicial interpretations of anti-discrimi-
nation law because it gives full recognition to the principle of reasonable
accommodations, acts as an equal protection standard, and operates at the
individual level. By adopting this standard, courts will ensure that the law
fulfills its goal of protecting persons with disabilities not only from dis-
crimination based on invidious bias but also discrimination that arises
from socio-political factors.
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